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Abstract 
The share of indirect taxes in tax revenues, specifically consumption taxes, is quite high in Turkey when compared to 
other OECD economies. This emphasis on indirect taxes in Turkey, as well as other developing economies, is argued 
to emerge from the inability of the government to collect direct taxes because of the existence of a large informal 
sector that is not easily taxable. It has been suggested that the recent increase in the indirect taxes puts the burden on 
mostly the poor, raising concerns of inequality. This paper evaluates the efficiency of the current indirect taxes in 
Turkey by taking into account distributional concerns. Using data from the 2003 Household Budget Survey, we 
estimate elasticities of different consumption goods and services using AIDS method. We then perform a marginal tax 
reform analysis to assess the efficiency of indirect taxes. Our findings indicate that there is room for improvement and 
the current tax rates are not optimal.
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Bogazici University Research Fund 08HC102. 
Citation: Oya Pinar Ardic and Burcay Erus and Gurcan Soydan, (2010) ''An evaluation of indirect taxes in Turkey'', Economics Bulletin, 
Vol. 30 no.4 pp. 2787-2801. 
Submitted: Jan 06 2010.   Published: October 27, 2010. 
 
     1. Introduction
Indirect taxes in Turkey constitute a large proportion of total tax revenues: their
share in tax revenues has steadily increased since the 1980s, and by 2008 has become
65%. At the same time, tax revenues as a share of GDP have increased from around
10% to around 20%. Figure 1 below depicts the evolution of the shares of direct and
indirect taxes in total tax revenues.1
A casual look at the data suggests that indirect taxes, and speciﬁcally taxes on
consumption goods and services, are extensive and come in a variety. Although in
terms of VAT, Turkey is not much diﬀerent from the OECD average (15.8% vs.
16.6% of total taxes, respectively) because of the extent of the other two types of
taxes on consumption of speciﬁc goods, namely special consumption tax and special
communication tax, consumption taxes constitute a signiﬁcant share in tax revenues.
Special consumption tax in Turkey was around 24% of tax revenues in 2006, while this
share was around 11% on average for the OECD countries at the same time period.
This emphasis on indirect taxes in Turkey, and more speciﬁcally on taxes on con-
sumption, can be argued to originate due to the inability of the government to collect
direct taxes. An important characteristic of developing economies is the existence of a
large informal sector that is not easily taxable. The size of the informal sector makes
taxation diﬃcult and costly, and especially so for direct taxes. Since administrative
costs of tax collection in indirect taxes are lower than those in direct taxes, developing
economies rely mostly on indirect taxes. It should also be noted that VAT reforms
since 1970s (and in 1985 in Turkey) and various incentive mechanisms towards con-
sumers to collect receipts for their purchases rendered indirect tax collection more
eﬃcient leading to increasing use of them in revenue generation by governments.
For example, Zenginobuz et al. (2006) report that in the aftermath of the 2001
crisis, the Turkish government, in pursuing ﬁscal tightening, relied increasingly on
taxes on consumption to raise revenues. Furthermore, their ﬁndings indicate that
the burden of these taxes have mostly been on the poor. For some consumption
goods the taxes were so high that evasion became an attractive option but not at
the same scale as evasion in income taxes.2 In evaluating the results from this study
together with the data presented above, an interesting and important question arises:
how eﬃcient is the current indirect tax system in Turkey and how does the marginal
eﬃciency of taxes change with equity concerns? Hence, the purpose of this paper is
to evaluate the marginal eﬃciency of indirect taxes in Turkey by taking into account
distributional concerns. The obvious and most important outcome of indirect taxes
1See Bulutoglu and Thirsk (1997) for a detailed historical account of the Turkish tax system and
tax reforms.
2According to a Turkish daily newspaper, in 2004 Ministry of Finance found tax eva-
sion rates of 33% and 16% for income taxes and VAT respectively. (Radikal, May 2, 2006.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=186080)
1is their eﬀect on relative prices. As changes in relative prices have implications for
the economy as a whole in terms of demand, production, tax revenues, and income
distribution, ensuring the eﬃciency of the indirect tax system is crucial. The issue
is of further importance once one considers ongoing eﬀorts for a major structural
reform in Turkish taxation system (see Ter-Minassian (2009), prepared for a seminar
on tax reform by Ministry of Finance, for a discussion of challenges in tax reform for
Turkey).
There is a vast empirical literature on the eﬃciency of indirect taxes.3 For exam-
ple, Nichele and Robin (1995) assess the consequences of two reforms in the French
indirect tax system, namely VAT harmonization and carbon tax. Madden (1995)
ﬁnds that there has been room for reform in the indirect tax system in Ireland in the
1980s. Liberati (2001) studies the distributional eﬀects of changes in indirect taxes
in Italy, and ﬁnds that a simple two-rate VAT structure is welfare-improving and
revenue neutral. Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2003) assess the indirect tax system in
Greece and conclude that a simpler tax structure is more equitable and more eﬃcient.
Munoz and Cho (2003) analyze the eﬀects of introducing VAT in Ethiopia and com-
pare it to the incidence of the earlier sales tax in eﬀect. Kaplanoglou and Newbery
(2008) analyze distributional impact of indirect taxation and three alternatives to the
current system using data from Greece.
There are three major indirect tax types in Turkey: taxes on consumption goods
and services, taxes on foreign trade and stamp tax. Among the three, taxes on
consumption goods and services constitute about 66% of revenues from indirect taxes,
i.e. 42% of total tax revenues as of 2008.4 As the majority of tax revenues come from
consumption taxes, they merit special attention. As mentioned above, consumption
taxes are composed of value added tax (VAT), special consumption tax, and special
communication tax. An 18% VAT is levied on all transactions involving consumption
of goods and services, although reduced rates of 1% and 8% apply on certain items
such as basic food, newspapers, etc. VAT has been in eﬀect since 1985. Special
consumption tax is levied on cigarettes, gas, energy, alcohol, cell phone services and
luxury goods at various rates. In addition, the communication sector, i.e. cable radio
and television, cell phone services and telecommunication, is subject to a special
communication tax levied after the 1999 earthquake to cope with the large budget
deﬁcits of the time, which is still in eﬀect. As of 2008, revenues from VAT, special
consumption tax, and special communication tax amount to around 25%, 34%, and
3Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1961) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1971) are classical
theoretical works in this area. Ray (1997) provides a review of both theoretical and empirical work
until mid 1990s. There is a continuing stream of theoretical studies as exempliﬁed by Kaplow (2006)
and Belan et al. (2008).
4For further details on tax data, see the web site of the Revenue Administration: www.gib.gov.tr,
and Revenue Administration’s Activity Report for 2008 on the same web site.
24% of revenues from indirect taxes, respectively.5
The analysis of this paper follows a series of studies started by the seminal work
of Ahmad and Stern (1991). Following Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2003), the paper
estimates the marginal social cost of taxation for twelve groups of commodities. Using
an iso-elastic social welfare function and addressing distributional concerns, we report
results for various degrees of inequality aversion. Data from Household Budget Survey
(HBS) of 2003 by TurkStat is utilized to estimate a demand system that eventually
allows the computation of elasticities.6 Using the same data set adjustments reﬂecting
equity concerns are made and discussed. The results indicate that there is room for
improvement in terms of eﬃciency of the indirect tax system in Turkey.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
methodology used in marginal tax reform analysis. Section 3 summarizes the current
Turkish tax data and the data used in estimations. The fourth section describes the
ﬁndings. A discussion of results and conclusion follows in section 5.
2. Methodology
In this section, we describe brieﬂy the methodology we employ in tax reform
analysis. In this setup, the government, or the ﬁscal authority, maximizes social
welfare subject to the revenue constraint by addressing distributional concerns to ﬁnd
optimal tax rates on each commodity group. For further details, see Kaplanoglou and
Newbery (2003).
Consider a model with h = 1,...,H households and k = 1,...,K goods. Let p
be the vector of producer prices and q be the vector of consumer prices such that
q = p + t where t is the vector of indirect taxes. Suppose further that vh(yh + g,q)
is the welfare of household h, where yh is net income and g denotes transfers. xh
denotes the vector of demands by household h and X, which is simply the sum of xh
over all h, is the aggregate demand vector. Finally, let V ≡ W(v1,v2,...,vH) be a
social welfare function.
The question, then, is as follows: What is the value of t that maximizes social






H) subject to R(t) = t
0X ≥ ¯ R (1)
5Note that although VAT is levied on almost all transactions and at a relatively high rate for
almost all goods and services, it only constitutes 25% of indirect tax revenues while special con-
sumption tax, which is levied only on luxury goods adds up to 34% of revenues from indirect taxes.
However, note also that food has a very large budget share and a low VAT rate. This might, there-
fore, oﬀer some explanation to revenues from VAT having a relatively low share in indirect tax
revenues.
6The 2003 HBS is the ﬁrst TurkStat had conducted since 1994. Although survey data from 2004,
2005 and 2006 were also available at the time of writing, neither is as detailed as 2003. See section
3 and footnote 10 for further details.
3where ¯ R denotes required revenues.
Assuming producer prices do not change when taxes change, it is possible to derive
the marginal social productivity of taxing good j. Since ∂R/∂tj denotes the extra
revenues generated by taxing good j by one more unit (of currency), and −∂W/∂tj
denotes the loss in social welfare due to a one unit increase in taxes on good j, it is





That is, θj shows the trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts and costs of taxing good j. After




















ωj is the budget share of good j and βh is the social marginal utility of income–and
transfers–to household h.7 In this regard, it is possible to interpret dj as the degree
of concentration of the consumption of good j on those with high values of βh, i.e.
the poor.
Hence, the marginal social productivity of tax j depends inversely on dj, and
positively on own-price and cross-price elasticities. It is possible to interpret 1/dj as
the tax appeal of good j. For example, if the absolute value of own-price elasticity is
high for good j, the distortionary cost of tax is higher. But distributional concerns
in the form of a high dj in this case oﬀsets this distortionary eﬀect.







h=1 πh(vh)1−γ ,γ 6= 1,γ > 0
PH
h=1 lnvh ,γ = 1
(5)
where πh is the share of group h in the population, and γ is the coeﬃcient of inequality
7βh is calculated as βh = ∂W
∂vhαh, where αh = ∂v
h
∂(yh+g) is the private marginal utility of income to

























where we approximate βh by (ch)−γ. Thus, a higher γ implies a higher concern of
inequality by the government, and γ = 0 indicates no inequality aversion. 8.
Using household level data and AIDS estimation methodology of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980), it is possible to estimate own-price and cross-price elasticities
of commodity groups.9 Then, under various degrees of inequality aversion, i.e. for
various values of γ, it is possible to calculate θj, j = 1,...,K. It will then be possible
to rank these commodity groups from the least taxable to the most taxable: the lower
the value of θj is, the lower the tax productivity of good j will be. Hence, tax tare
on good j should be lower.
3. Data
For the analysis we use the set of elasticity estimates calculated using the Almost
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) methodology of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).10 Es-
timation is based on the data from Household Budget Survey 2003 (HBS 2003) con-
ducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat).11 The HBS 2003 is a survey
8It is also possible to use indirect utility calculations from AIDS estimation. Most empirical
studies do use (ch)−γ and for the sake of comparability with those studies we prefer to use the
calculations where beta is approximated by (ch)−γ
9Note that one may need to modify the AIDS method proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer slightly
when using data from a household budget survey. Consider the following situation where household
i does not consume good j at the time of data collection. This may not be because household i
does not prefer to consume good j, but simply because household i does not need to consume good
j at the time of data collection. This is a typical example of a censored regression and requires a
two-stage estimation. To correct for potential biases that may arise as a result, we use the two-stage
estimation method proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). For space considerations, further details
are not included here. See Ardic et al. (2010) for the details on estimation methodology.
10Regression R2 values range from 10.24 to 46.6. Estimated coeﬃcients are usually signiﬁcant and
control variables are of the expected sign. Several control variables to account for socio-economic
characteristics of the households are added to both the ﬁrst and the second stage estimations. For
example, household size, age and education level of household head, and seasonal, urban and regional
diﬀerences are controlled for as well as some variables relevant for speciﬁc commodity groups, such
as private car ownership dummy for demand for transportation services. See Ardic et al. (2010) for
further details.
11While more recent surveys (2004, 2005, and 2006) are also available, the one in 2003 is based on
5of a representative random sample of all private households in Turkey. From January
2003 to December 2003, a total of 25,920 households were surveyed (1512 households
from urban and 648 households from rural areas per month). Excluding those who
quit, the survey results in a total sample of 25,764 households.
The survey data report monthly expenditures of households. Household expendi-
tures on goods and services are coded under 198 categories and then these expendi-
tures are aggregated under 12 major commodity groups based on COICOP (Classi-
ﬁcation of Individual Consumption by Purpose) system. The analysis uses variation
in prices across NUTS2 level regions as well as months of the year to estimate elas-
ticities.12 Table 1 presents these commodity groups along with own price and income
elasticities, indirect tax rates, and the budget shares calculated from HBS 2003.13
The ﬁgures are as expected. Food, clothing, health are among the categories with
low elasticity. Transportation has one of the lowest elasticities, possibly reﬂecting
the fact that the elasticity estimates are obtained from data covering one year only.
Recreation and culture has the highest elasticity along with furnishing and house
maintenance which covers big ticket items. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco is highly
inelastic, possibly due to prevalence of tobacco addiction.
The other important component of the marginal tax reform analysis is the weighted
average indirect tax rates pertaining to the 12 commodity aggregates. Value-Added-
Tax, Special Consumption Tax, Special Communication Tax and Gambling Tax are
the indirect taxes on commodities that are taken into account when calculating the
tax rates from the relevant resolutions of the Council of Ministers and codes. They
are weighted according to the budget shares of these classiﬁcations within their group
in the Household Budget Survey. The average tax rates for the commodity groups,
thus found, are also given in Table 1. Alcohol and tobacco, transportation, and com-
munication are very heavily taxed in Turkey. Food, health, and education are the
least taxed categories.14
a much larger sample (about three times larger than the surveys in the following years). Moreover,
later surveys do not disclose the month in which a household is surveyed, information necessary
to measure variation in prices. TurkStat does not publicly disclose the data on region and month.
However, we are able to obtain the information on region and month of the year that an observation
belongs to from HBS 2003 by matching the inﬂation adjustment factor (the factor to inﬂate the
income) in the data with regional monthly inﬂation ﬁgures from TurkStat (CPI index for urban
and rural general price levels). In the later years this was not possible because inﬂation levels are
relatively low and does not allow us to diﬀerentiate across diﬀerent months and regions of the year.
12NUTS (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units) is a territorial classiﬁcation system of
data collection developed by Eurostat in the beginning of the 1970s in order to achieve coherence
and uniformity in regional data collection throughout the European Union. This is a hierarchical
system with three levels. Turkish Statistics Institute (Turkstat) conducts household surveys based
on sampling by NUTS2 classiﬁcation. There are 26 NUTS2 regions in Turkey, while the total number
of provinces is 81. See footnote 5 on identiﬁcation of household location and month of the survey.
13See Ardic et al. (2010) for all elasticities and standard errors obtained using bootstrap.
14In Turkey health care and education are publicly provided free of charge. In 2003 private
64. Results
Table 2 below summarizes the results of the marginal tax reform analysis based
on the elasticity estimates in Table 1 and Ardic et al. (2010).15 The analysis is
performed for diﬀerent levels of inequality aversion. Speciﬁcally, the values of the
parameter γ used are 0, 2, and 5. For each inequality aversion level, we present the
distributional characteristic of each category, d, and the marginal social productivity
of tax, θ. The goods and services are ranked from the least taxable to the most in
each γ category.
The diﬀerences in tax appeal indicates that there is room for improvement in tax
rates. For γ = 0, meaning no concern for equity (and same distributional coeﬃcient
for all categories), we ﬁnd the most likely candidates for higher taxation to be housing,
alcoholic beverage and tobacco, and recreational activities. Hotel and restaurant
expenditures, food, and furnishing follow these categories. Healthcare, clothing, and
others categories are those that are the least desirable for taxation.16 Transportation,
communication, and education follow these. The diﬀerence in the cost of taxation
is rather small. Our results are similar to Madden (1995) and Kaplanoglou and
Newbery (2003) who ﬁnd small diﬀerences across goods and services in terms of cost
of taxation. Goods that are candidates for higher taxes diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the
results for Greece (Kaplanoglou and Newbery, 2003) where tobacco and recreation
turn out to be the least desirable for a marginal tax increase. On the other hand our
results are in line with Irish case (Madden, 1995). As noted many times in the earlier
literature, the results should be considered with caution considering theoretical issues
in elasticity estimation and optimal tax calculations.
Given the results with no inequality concern, we can now focus on the impact of
the distributional concerns on rankings. Table 2 also displays the results for γ = 2 and
γ = 5. As may be expected, food, housing, and alcohol and tobacco categories, which
expenditures were about 2% and 28% of total expenditures in education and in health respectively.
Health expenditures consisted, mostly, of payments to private providers and informal payments to
public providers. Public and private sector were rather segregated markets in 2003, latter appealing
to wealthier households and resulting in an elasticity ﬁgure close to zero since health is a necessity.
Private provision of education was rather limited in 2003. Expenditures on education generally
include bulky items at school start, such as stationary, books, school uniform and others, which are
done out of household budget. Hence are elasticity estimate for education relates to these goods.
15The entire set of estimated elasticities–own price, cross price and income–are tabulated in Table
3 along with standard errors.
16θ for health category is negative. This implies decrease in tax revenues with further tax on
health. Madden (1995) report such ﬁnding for tobacco under some demand speciﬁcations with Irish
data and interprets it as a commodity speciﬁc Laﬀer eﬀect. In our case this results from large values
for cross-price elasticities. Health has a negative cross-price elasticity with transportation, which
is heavily taxed, and positive cross-price elasticity with food, which is taxed at lower rates. Large
share of public providers and informal payments in health may have resulted in those ﬁgures. Hence
the results regarding healthcare should be taken cautiously.
7constitute necessities, become less desirable to be taxed.17 In line with our results,
health and food are among the least taxed items currently (at about 8%). Alcohol and
tobacco, on the other hand are heavily taxed. It is clear from our results that these
taxes constitute a big burden for lower income households. It should also be noted,
however, that our results do not take into consideration health hazards related to
tobacco consumption, neither negative externalities on non-smokers. In the housing
and utilities category, taxes are rather large, about 19%. Housing and especially
utilities could constitute an area where a reduction in taxes may be considered for
equity purposes.
On the other hand furnishing, transportation, and education are now ranked
higher with greater equity consideration. It should be noted that education is pro-
vided for free to a large part of population in Turkey and private schools and other
educational activities are mostly used by wealthier households. Hence, an increase
in taxation is not of a big concern for poor households. However, private schools are
argued to take some of the burden from government and allow it to provide more
resources to the rest of population. Whether this justiﬁes a rather low tax rate of 8%
is left for further studies. In transportation the tax rates are already high at about
40% level and in furnishing tax rates are higher than many other categories.
For other categories we do not observe much of a change in the rankings. Recre-
ation and culture is still among the leading candidates for taxing and health ranks
the last for taxation.
5. Conclusion
This paper aims to evaluate the indirect taxes in eﬀect in Turkey using data from
the 2003 Household Budget Survey. After estimating elasticities for twelve commod-
ity groups using AIDS methodology of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), we follow
Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2003) to conduct a marginal tax reform analysis. When
there is no concern for inequality, we ﬁnd the most likely candidates for higher taxa-
tion to be housing, alcoholic beverage and tobacco, and recreational activities while
healthcare and clothing are those that are the least desirable for taxation. Once in-
equality aversion is inserted, food, housing, and alcohol and tobacco categories, which
constitute necessities, become less desirable to be taxed while recreation, education
and furnishings are the categories for which higher taxes are called.
At this point, we would like to note that our analysis is subject to usual caveats of
indirect tax reform studies. We assume competitive markets and disregard tax eva-
sion, an important characteristic of developing countries. Furthermore, the analysis
considers indirect taxes in isolation. It is clear that the system as a whole should be
investigated for a thorough investigation of the eﬃciency of taxes, including direct
17Alcohol and tobacco category is heavily dominated by tobacco which is very widely used in
Turkey especially in lower income brackets.
8taxes and institutional conditions. We would like to note, however, that it is still
beneﬁcial to evaluate the indirect taxes since they are easier to change and are in fact
often subject to change in Turkey.
An even more important caveat is the tax evasion which is prevalent in Turkey.
The analysis implicitly assumes away tax evasion. If it took place diﬀerentially across
the goods, marginal optimality would be miscalculated since oﬃcial tax rates that are
used in the analysis would diﬀer from the actual rates. Furthermore, if tax evasion
does also diﬀer across households with diﬀerent income levels, distributional concerns
may not be properly reﬂected in the results. Unfortunately data is lacking on tax
evasion and we leave analysis of tax evasion and eﬃciency of indirect taxes for further
studies.
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Figure 1: Share of Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes in Tax Revenues: 1923 - 2009
Source: Revenue Administration (www.gib.gov.tr)
12Tables
Aggregate Commodity Groups Aggregate Average Indirect Own Price Expenditure
Budget Shares Tax Rates Elasticities Elasticities
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 28.50% 8.50% -0.57 0.75
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 4.30% 83.70% -0.11 0.69
Clothing and Footwear 6.30% 15.40% -0.13 1.2
Housing, Water, Gas, Electricity & Other Fuels 27.90% 19.00% -0.74 0.86
Furnishing, House Maintenance & Equipment 5.80% 19.30% -1.65 1.84
Health 2.10% 8.30% -0.05 1.73
Transportation 9.50% 41.70% -0.06 1.45
Communication 4.30% 39.40% -1.06 0.92
Recreation and Culture 2.00% 16.50% -2.05 1.14
Education 1.80% 8.00% -0.68 0.9
Hotels, Cafes, Restaurants 4.00% 18.00% -0.87 0.66
Other Goods and Services 3.50% 20.80% -0.46 1.41
Table 1: Elasticities, average budget shares and average indirect taxes
γ = 0 γ = 2 γ = 5
Categories d θ Categories d θ Categories d θ
Health 1 -0.11 Health 0.32 -0.33 Health 0.02 -4.94
Other 1 0.36 Other 0.31 1.17 Housing 0.14 6.21
Clothing 1 0.51 Food & Beverages 0.69 1.26 Food & Beverages 0.08 10.74
Transportation 1 0.62 Clothing 0.35 1.45 Other 0.03 12.11
Communication 1 0.67 Communication 0.40 1.67 Hotels, Restaurants 0.05 16.28
Education 1 0.71 Alcohol & Tobacco 0.61 1.67 Alcohol & Tobacco 0.04 23.00
Furnishing 1 0.78 Housing 0.48 1.86 Communication 0.02 29.11
Food & beverages 1 0.86 Hotels, Restaurants 0.36 2.39 Clothing 0.02 32.24
Hotels, restaurants 1 0.87 Transportation 0.26 2.43 Transportation 0.01 63.24
Housing 1 0.89 Furnishing 0.30 2.60 Furnishing 0.01 73.53
Alcohol & Tobacco 1 1.02 Recreation & Culture 0.22 4.95 Recreation & Culture 0.01 135.71
Recreation & Culture 1 1.09 Education 0.14 5.23 Education 0.00 1253.20
Table 2: Distributional characteristics, d, and marginal revenue cost, θ
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